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ADMIRALTY LAW: CALIFORNIA SUES A VESSEL IN
REM FOR OIL DISCHARGE DAMAGES TO ITS WATER
AND MARINE LIFE
In a country that each day becomes more and more concerned with the problems of pollution, few happenings are
better publicized or arouse as much public outcry as do large
oil spills.
In California v. S.S. Bournemouth, a federal district
court held that an in rem action in admiralty could be
maintained against a vessel, by the State of California, for
damages to water and marine life caused by the vessel's discharge of bunker oil into the navigable waters of that state.
Bunker oil is essentially fuel oil used to operate vessels and
should be distinguished from oil carried as cargo by tankers.
Of course, due to the vast quantity of oil carried, tankers
usually cause the largest amount of vessel pollution, either
by design or by accident. The court, in denying defendant's
motion to dismiss, ruled that the pollution of navigable waters
by a vessel is a maritime tort which gives rise to a maritime
lien against that vessel.2
One of the most publicized recent tanker-caused pollutions was the wreck of the Torrey Canyon off the southern
coast of England, in March 1967. That wreck caused the loss
to the sea of most of the entire cargo (119,000 tons of Kuwait
crude oil). As a result, scores of birds, fish and other sea
life were killed, many by the detergents used in a frantic
effort to keep the large oil slicks from reaching the white
sand resort beaches of England and France.3 Today, the
1 307 F. Supp. 922 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
307 F. Supp. at 926; accord, The Anaces, 93 F. 240 (4th Cir.
1899).
3 Cairns, Oil Spill Report, Tii ORAGE Disc, Jan. - Feb., 1970,
Vol. 19, No. 4 (Special Insert, not paginated) (The Magazine
of the Gulf Cos., Published Bi-Monthly for Shareholders
and Employees). Even more important than the deaths of
2
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Torrey Canyon would not even make the "Top 38" list of
prominent oil tankers, all of which are over 200,000 deadweight tons.4 The World Almanac lists six tankers- the
largest currently cruising the oceans-at 326,500 deadweight
tons each, approximately three times the size of the Torrey
Canyon. 5 But, as the Bournemouth case indicates, tankers
are not the only culprits, even among vessels. Each year,
thousands of gallons of oil and far deadlier pollutants are
intentionally flushed, pumped or dumped into the navigable
waters of the United States by ships, barges and boats of
all sizes. 6 The results are obvious, and the problem acute.
In sustaining jurisdiction in admiralty, the c o u r t, in
Bournemouth, rejected the argument, made by both parties,
that the Extension of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction
Act 7 applied to this case. That act provides in part:
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States shall extend to and include all cases of
damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a
vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such
damage or injury be done or consummated on land.
the birds, fish and minute sea life directly caused by the oil
in one of these disasters, is the effect their demise has on the
food chains in the surrounding waters. Countless additonal
marine animals die because their food source is gone, or
because some food source down the food chain has been
decimated. The effect multiplies rapidly.
Tim WoRm ALmAwAC 116 (1970 ed. L. Long).
5 Id.
6 One particular intentional cause of oil pollution is the
practice of "ballasting" tanks, used by both tankers and
dry cargo vessels. As the ships' bunker oil or fuel oil tanks
are emptied on a voyage, the ships take on water in these
tanks to maintain trim, stability and seaworthiness. But,
as the ships near their ports of destination, they must get
rid of this oil-water mixture so that they will be able to
"top off" or fill their fuel tanks in port. Consequently,
the tanks are pumped, and this oily mixture is spread upon
the water. See generally Cairns, supra note 3.
7 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).
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In any such case suit may be brought in rem or in
personam according to the principles of law and the
rules of practice obtaining in cases where the injury
or damage has been done and consummated on navigable water .... 8
Historically, from the time of The Plymouth,9 the courts
of the United States steadfastly held to the doctrine that shipto-shore torts were not maritime in nature and, consequently,
were without the admiralty jurisdiction granted to the federal courts by the United States Constitution. ° The doctrine
was explained in The Mary Stewart:"
In cases of tort the locality alone determines the
admiralty jurisdiction. Only those torts are maritime
which happen on navigable waters. If the injury complained of happened on land, it is not cognizable in
the admirality, even though it may have originated
on the water.12
The inequities of this doctrine were apparent particularly in
cases where a vessel collided with a pier or a bridge. In such
a case, if the vessel was the tortfeasor, then the owner of
the pier or bridge had to sue on the common law side of the
federal court or in some law forum where the doctrine of
contributory negligence might bar recovery entirely. On the
other hand, if the pier or bridge owner was at fault, the
vessel owners could sue in admiralty, where the comparative
negligence doctrine would be applied. 13 It was this inequity
that Congress sought to correct when it passed the Extension
of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction Act in 1948.14
However, the federal court judge n o t e d that, in the
sId.

0 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865).
III, § 2.

16 U.S. CoNsT. art.

11 10 F. 137 (E!D. Va. 1881).
12 Id. at 138 (Citation omitted.).
18 Fematt v. City of Los Angeles, 196 F. Supp. 89
(S.D. Cal. 1961).
14 H.R. REP. No. 1523, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
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Bournemouth case, the injury was to the water itself and to
the marine life therein, not to the land. Therefore, the court
decided that the injury here met the traditional "locality
test" used to determine whether a tort is maritime in nature;
that is, the tort took place on the navigable waters of the State
of California and was the result of the operation of a vessel
engaged in maritime commerce. Thus, the primary question
was whether such a maritime tort gave rise to a maritime
lien, independent of any statute; a maritime lien being a
necessary foundation to the maintenance of an action in rem
in admiralty against a vessel.
The defendant contended that, absent a specific statute,
only two types of maritime torts create maritime liens - collision claims and personal injury claims. Rejecting that contention, the court said:
A maritime tort involving no accident, and mere
injury to property, is obviously out of the ordinary;
collision and personal injury suits are common. But
relative frequency of occurrence is not a reasonable
standard by which an admiralty court will determine
the range of appropriate remedies for various types
of maritime torts. 5
Support was found for the court's ruling in the cases of
The Atlanta,16 The Escanaba,17 and The Lydia,18 in which
martime liens were recognized for the tort of conversion.
The court reasoned that the alleged injury to property in the
Bournemouth case was of the same general nature as a conversion of property and thus should likewise be protected by the
creation of a maritime lien. The court noted the fact that
the statutes of the United States provide all vessel owners
with the privilege of limiting their liability to the value of
15 307 F. Supp. at 927.

16 82 F. Supp. 218 (S.D. Ga. 1948).
17 96 F. 252 (N.D. IM. 1899).
18 1

F.2d 18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 616 (1924).
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their interest in the vessel. 19 Thus, in the absence of a

finding of "privity of knowledge," the owners may limit
their liability to the value of their interest in the vessel.2
In cases like the Torrey Canyon, where the vessel is com-

pletely destroyed, this amounts to a complete exemption
since the vessel's value is determined after, not before, the
accident.2 1 Furthermore, the court noted that the owners
of vessels are often unknown and not amenable to service
of process for an in personam action. 22 The federal district
court concluded that this was insulation enough, and that
there were strong reasons of justice and convenience in this
case for allowing a maritime lien and an in rem action in
admiralty for the discharge of oil.2
Merely because the Oil Pollution Act, 1924,24 gives the
federal government a cause of action in admiralty against
a vessel, including a lien thereon, which has discharged oil,
was held no reason to presume that other existing common
law rights and remedies were intended to be extinguished
by the 1924 Act. 25 This is made apparent by express language
in the 1924 Act that its provisions are in addition to existing
26
laws for the preservation and protection of navigable waters.
Although the Bournemouth case has not yet gone to
trial, the reasoning of the federal district court is sound in
allowing the action to be brought on the admiralty side of
the federal court. There was no question that the tort occurred on the navigable waters of the United States and of
the State of California. The vessel was moored at a pier in
19 Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability, 46 U.S.C. §§ 18196 (1964).
20
21

Id. § 183(a).

Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104 (1871).
307 F. Supp. at 928-29, quoting, The Anaces, 93 F. 240, 244
(1899).
2
307 F. Supp. at 929.
24 33 U.S.C. §§ 431-37 (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV 1968).
25 307 F. Supp. at 929.
26 33 U.S.C. § 437 (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV 1968).
22
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Long Beach harbor when the oil was discharged. Also, without getting into the history of admiralty law, the tort was
maritime in nature.27 There is apparently no reason to deny
to the states the same access to the admiralty courts, now
enjoyed by the federal government, to sue for the pollution
of their navigable waters. Indeed, in light of the safeguards
allowed in admiralty actions to vessel owners, the in rem
action and the maritime lien against the offending vessel
appears to be a very effective method of combating the pollution problem.
With the opening of the Arkansas River waterway project, the State of Oklahoma is going to join the ranks of the
maritime states. For all practical purposes, this will be Oklahoma's first experience with navigable waters, maritime commerce and the whole body of admiralty law. Most of Oklahoma's pollution problems of the future will not come from
vessels on navigable waters, but, as barge and tug traffic
increases on the Arkansas River waterway, there will undoubtedly be oil spills and accidents. Oklahoma now has a
body of law which deals with the general problems of pollution of waters and watercourses. 28 However, the availability of an action in admiralty and the resulting lien on
an offending barge, tug, or other vessel can be of immense
importance to the State as an additional tool for controlling
pollution on the waterway.
In the opinion of the author, the advantage of suing for
damages to the water itself is that it eliminates the necessity
of proving that the polluting material ever reached the shore
or banks of the river, or of showing who owns the contiguous land and/or riparian rights. These problems are eliminated because the damage is done the minute the pollutant
joins the water.
27
28

The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 35 (1865).
See generally Comment, Water & Watercourses: Water
Pollution Laws and Their Enforcement in Oklahoma, 22
OKLA. L. Rv. 317 (1969).
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